

From City Hall to Parliament: Electoral Performance of Mayors in the 2025 Czech General Election¹

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Abstract

This article examines the electoral performance of mayors in the 2025 Czech general election, focusing on candidates from parties represented in the Chamber of Deputies. Amid the growing personalisation of politics, mayors are often seen as valuable assets to party lists due to their local visibility and perceived competence. Using a dataset of 2,052 candidates, we compare the electoral performance of mayors and deputy mayors against other high-status professions (medical doctors, lawyers, teachers) and incumbent MPs. Methodologically, the study employs a probit model to estimate the probability of election and quantile regression to analyse preferential vote gains relative to ballot position.

The results confirm that mayors hold a statistically significant electoral advantage (+4 pp probability of election), yet they do not outperform medical doctors or incumbent MPs. The analysis further reveals significant variations across political parties and regions. While the STAN movement fielded the most mayors, their individual electoral impact was often surpassed by that of other professionals within the party. Conversely, the populist ANO movement successfully leveraged its mayoral candidates, who significantly outperformed the party's average. The findings suggest that while municipal experience remains a key recruitment channel in this multi-level political system, the 'mayoral bonus' is finite and heavily dependent on party context and regional dynamics.

Keywords: mayors; parliamentary elections; personalisation; Czech Republic; preferential voting

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1. Introduction

The shift of voter attention from political parties to individual politicians is a well-documented phenomenon, observed not only in Europe but across liberal democracies in general. This trend is supported by extensive research over the last two decades focusing on the personalisation of politics (e.g., Garzia, 2019; McAllister, 2007; Van Aelst, Sheaffer, Hubé, & Papathanassopoulos, 2016). While traditional party identification is declining, an increasing number of voters prioritise characteristics such as personal trust in a candidate or their track record at the local level. Consequently, the question of who represents a given party has become increasingly vital to voters, especially when compared to the declining interest in formal party programs (Linek & Voženílková, 2017).

As recent research indicates, the phenomenon of personalization is also significantly present in the Czech Republic. Linek and Voženílková argue that the decision-making process of Czech voters was already highly personalised as early as the 1990s (2017, p. 171). Numerous other studies have addressed this trend from various perspectives (e.g. Cabada, 2016; Jurek, 2012; Smolková & Balík, 2018; Voženílková, 2018). Voters tend to fixate more on political leaders than on party brands or policy content. This applies not only to national party leaders but also to local leaders, including mayors. Balík, for instance, identifies a phenomenon that can be described as a 'voting bonus for mayors' or 'mayoral advantage' (Balík, 2009, p. 214). This thesis is further supported by recent studies specifically targeting Czech mayors and their electoral successes (Čapek, 2025; Pileček, 2021).

The number of mayors in the Czech parliament is gradually increasing, as shown by Dvořák (2023, p. 204). A clear manifestation of this trend was observed in the well-documented case of the PirSTAN coalition during the 2021 Chamber of Deputies elections (e.g. Drašar, 2025; Lysek & Lebeda, 2021; Lysek & Macků, 2022). In these elections, the Pirate Party, who were leading in the pre-election polls at the time, ran in a coalition with STAN.¹ However, due to preferential voting, candidates from STAN secured 33 of the coalition's 37 mandates. This outcome can be attributed to the fact that STAN benefited from regionally well-known figures, whereas the Pirates lacked such personalities (Maškarinec & Naxera, 2022, p. 17). Among STAN candidates who outperformed their Pirate counterparts on the ballot, a significant majority were mayors². Their influence is further confirmed by Lysek and Lebeda (2021), who found that party support for STAN significantly correlates with the presence of local mayors in the respective regions.

Mayors are generally expected to enter elections with a specific advantage stemming from several factors. Primarily, within the municipality where the candidate serves as mayor, the *friends and neighbours effect* is highly likely to manifest. This effect is based on the premise that a candidate in national elections attracts votes from citizens who already know them from the local level (Campbell,

Cowley, Vivyan, & Wagner, 2019). Mayors appear to be the logical beneficiaries of this support, as demonstrated in the Czech context by Pileček (2021). This is further reinforced by the fact that they can effectively spend their entire term campaigning, as any positive development in their municipality can be presented as their own achievement (Gordon & Landa, 2009, p. 1493). This is also illustrated by mayors' long-standing status as the most trusted constitutional officials in the country³.

One might conclude that due to mayors' consistent electoral performance and ability to attract voters, political parties frequently place them on candidate lists across all levels of governance⁴. Research shows that this may not be entirely true. Czech voters are more likely to promote regional assembly and municipal council members than the selectors from political parties (Däubler & Linek, 2024, p. 9)⁵. The disparity between the selectors and the voters is further illustrated, for example, by Jurajda & München (2015).

Either way, a look at the 2021 general elections reveals that they were remarkably successful for mayors. Nearly one-sixth of the new Chamber of Deputies consisted of candidates who qualified for the office from the position of mayor⁶. The 2025 elections followed the trends of the previous cycle, characterised by a persistent atmosphere of strong polarisation that has endured in the Czech Republic since the COVID-19 crisis (see e.g. Cirhan & Stauber, 2026; Macková, Novotná, Čejková, & Hrbková, 2024; Malý & Michal, 2023) and a fundamental conflict over democratic values and norms (Guasti & Michal, 2025).

The electoral contest pitted two distinct political blocs against each other. On one side, the incumbent government, comprising the coalition SPOLU, STAN, and the Pirates. On the other side, the ANO movement, along with smaller populist parties, the SPD and AUTO⁷. This polarisation raises the question of whether local-level personalisation can still play a significant role in highly intensified national elections, or whether local personalities were overshadowed by a highly nationalised campaign.

The objective of this article is to examine the electoral effectiveness of mayors in the 2025 Czech general election. Specifically, this article addresses two research questions: (1) Are mayors more successful in moving up the ballot through preferential votes than candidates from other respected professions? (2) How does the electoral performance of mayors vary across different political parties and regions?

The article's structure is as follows. The second section outlines the research context, focusing on the position of mayors in the Czech political system and the theoretical framework of the personalisation of politics. The third section describes the data and methodology employed, specifically the probit and quantile regression models. The fourth section presents the empirical results of the analysis. Finally, the fifth section summarises the main findings and discusses the limits of the study.

2. Mayors and personalisation in the Czech context

The Czech Republic has a specific institutional framework in which, unlike its neighbouring countries, mayors are not directly elected, despite a historical debate over such a change (see e.g. Jüptner, 2009). Voters first elect the municipal council, which then elects the mayor. At the same time, a large number of mayors, particularly in smaller municipalities, are not members of any political party (see e.g. Kostelecký, Bernard, Mansfeldová, & Mikešová, 2024).

Compared to other candidates for the Chamber of Deputies, mayors occupy a distinct position, as they are already established politicians at a relatively significant level of governance. This is particularly true for mayors of larger cities, where they are in charge of a larger administrative infrastructure. Furthermore, their candidacy is only possible because of the permissive approach to the accumulation of mandates that prevails in the Czech Republic.

Although dual mandating is prohibited, restricted, or simply uncommon in other countries, it remains a standard practice in the Czech Republic (see e.g. Hájek, 2016; Navarro, 2009). Although certain elements of self-regulation and voluntary restraint can be observed, for instance, in the varying internal policies of political parties (Hájek, 2016, pp. 160–161), the accumulation of mandates is still a widespread phenomenon, as noted by various authors (e.g. Bernard, 2013; Pileček, 2021; Ryšavý, 2016). This situation can be illustrated by the well-known case of Bohuslav Svoboda. As late as 2025, at the age of 81, he concurrently held the positions of MP, mayor of Prague, and remained an active gynaecologist.

Thus, if mayors seek to advance to higher levels of governance, there are very few institutional barriers in their way. The existing literature indicates that mayors' orientation toward positions in the higher levels of the political system is common both in the Czech Republic and abroad. Dodeigne, Krukowska & Lazauskienė (2018, pp. 96–99), for example, employ a typology of mayors which identifies a non-negligible number of European mayors as 'nationally-oriented' or 'multi-level' mayors. Their extensive survey confirms that the Czech Republic, alongside France, Italy, and Serbia, possesses the most politically ambitious mayors in Europe, specifically those aspiring to reach levels of governance beyond the municipal sphere (Dodeigne et al., 2018, pp. 108–111). This aligns with earlier data from Kjaer (2006), who also noted that Czech mayors are among the most ambitious in Europe, with one in seven aspiring for a seat in parliament⁸.

There are two overlapping phenomena. First, mayors themselves often plan careers in high-level politics and utilise their municipal office as a sort of political elevator. Second, political parties value their mayors and seek to field them in as many elections as possible, or even specifically recruit active mayors into their ranks. Generally, local and regional politicians, and mayors in particular, represent a welcome recruitment pool for political parties. Which is evident

from the regional as well as parliamentary elections (Ryšavý, 2016; Ryšavý & Čermák, 2015).

What, however, leads parties to believe that mayors are such effective candidates? It appears that merely mentioning the mayoral profession on the ballot paper generates additional preferential votes. This is evident not only in the disproportionate results within the PirSTAN coalition in 2021 or the overall strong national performance of STAN, a party primarily composed of mayors. It is also observable at the level of regional elections, as shown in previous collective volumes (Balík, Pink, & Dvořáková, 2013; Eibl, Pink, Voda, & Sax, 2018). As Däubler & Linek (2024) point out, according to the election results, voters generally prefer local politicians even more than the political parties themselves. Interestingly, voters tend to perceive mayors as the primary representatives of their municipalities, even though they do not legally possess strong executive powers (Balík, 2009, pp. 74–75).

Voters are more likely to be familiar with their own mayor or the mayor of a neighbouring town than with a random candidate on the list. This reality is manifested in the friends and neighbours effect, a term used to describe the relationship between the geographical proximity of a voter and a candidate (Arzheimer & Evans, 2012). This effect is characterised by an increased number of votes for a candidate in the vicinity of their residence, as demonstrated both in the Czech context (e.g. Malcová, 2012) and internationally (see e.g. Johnston, Wickham-Jones, Pattie, Cutts, & Pemberton, 2016; Panagopoulos & Bailey, 2020; Put, 2021).

Specifically regarding mayors, research by Pileček (2021) shows that this effect is more visible in small and less populated municipalities. He explicitly identifies mayors as prime examples of candidates capable of mobilising their home electorate (Pileček, 2021, p. 235). Mikešová (2019, pp. 418–420) expresses a similar view. This is also linked to arguments that the personalisation of politics in the Czech Republic is becoming increasingly visible, resulting in more frequent efforts to utilise local candidates (Malcová, 2012; Mikešová, 2019).

Literature primarily focuses on the electoral outcomes of local candidates, a group to which mayors belong, as a whole (e.g. Blais, Gidengil, Dobrzynska, Nevitte, & Adeau, 2003; Däubler & Linek, 2024; Roy & Alcantara, 2015). Mayors are frequently mentioned because their results tend to be more significant than those of other local candidates. At the same time, however, authors such as Put and Maddens (2015, p. 613) point out that a mayor of a small municipality does not possess as great an advantage as a mayor of a larger one, which somewhat contradicts the findings of Pileček.

Naturally, mayors are not the only candidates who benefit from the fact that voters often decide based on personal familiarity or the information provided on the ballot papers. For instance, Atkeson and Hamel (2020) found in their study of Californian elections that information about a candidate's occupation can

play a more significant role than their party affiliation. Similar conclusions, that candidate characteristics are highly influential, are reached by Crowder-Meyer et al. (2020). Among the occupations most favoured by voters are teachers (Crowder-Meyer et al., 2020, pp. 138–141), medical doctors and incumbent MPs (Dvořák, 2023; Dvořák & Pink, 2023; see e.g. Sedláčková, 2012; Voda, 2014).

From this perspective, Jurajda and München's findings are particularly interesting. According to them, medical doctors are popular among Czech voters and secure a higher share of preferential votes. However, this popularity is often not reflected in their initial position on the candidate list. The same applies to municipal council and regional assembly members (Däubler & Linek, 2024, pp. 8–10). In contrast, lawyers are frequently overestimated by the selectors. They are placed higher on the lists, yet their actual electoral results do not match this positioning, as voters do not show them the same level of favouritism (Jurajda & München, 2015, pp. 458–460).

Furthermore, it is essential to consider other characteristics that may influence electoral outcomes. Beyond candidates' occupations, their highest level of education also plays a significant role. Czech voters generally value academic titles, and the higher the degree, the more preferential votes it tends to attract (Däubler & Linek, 2024). These titles function more effectively in smaller municipalities, where they are less common (Jurajda & München, 2015).

Similarly, being placed at the top or at least in a winnable position on the ballot is a major advantage. The leader of the candidate list receives the highest number of preferential votes, and as the position on the candidate list drops, the number of preferential votes decreases rapidly (Voda, 2014, p. 264).

Another undeniable factor is the incumbency effect, which is evident in the Czech Republic both at the parliamentary level (Voda, 2014; Voženílková & Hejtmánek, 2015) and at lower levels of governance (Bernard & Šafr, 2016; Čapek, 2025; Linek & Škvrňák, 2024). A brief look at the MPs elected in 2025 reveals that more than half were re-elected⁹. It is the highest number of successful incumbents since the establishment of the independent Czech Republic. In previous years, the re-election rate hovered around 40–45% (Bakke, 2022, pp. 68–69).

In addition to these characteristics, the 2025 elections in the Czech Republic witnessed a relatively strong initiative advocating support for female candidates through preferential voting¹⁰. A record 52 women were elected to the Chamber of Deputies, representing 26% of all MPs. Notably, 13 of them were elected because they received more preferential votes than other candidates on their candidate list. While the gender dimension of elections is not the focus of this article, it appears to have played a role in the recent elections and warrants mention.

Regarding the electoral context itself, several points must be clarified. Elections to the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic are held in 14 regions¹¹, which correspond to the regional administrative structure, with a total of 200 mandates to be distributed. Political parties have their own candidate lists in

each region, and a different number of seats are redistributed in each of them. To enter the Chamber, a party must cross a national electoral threshold of 5%¹².

Crucial to this research is the option of giving candidates preferential votes. A voter selects one party in a given region and can cast a preferential vote for up to four candidates on the ballot. If a candidate receives at least 5% of the total votes cast for their party in that region, they are prioritised for a mandate and move to the top of the list. Otherwise, the initial order of the candidate list, as determined by the political parties themselves, remains decisive.

Since the 2021 reform, the Czech Republic has implemented not only new thresholds for coalitions but also a two-round system for allocating seats. The first round takes place at the regional level, where the majority of seats are allocated. Votes for parties that did not receive enough votes in a region to secure a mandate, or those that had surplus votes after securing a mandate, are then distributed in the second round. In the 2025 elections, 12 seats were distributed in the second round, with two of them going to mayors and one to a deputy mayor.

3. Data

The analysis is based on data published by the Czech Statistical Office via the Volby.cz portal (ČSÚ, 2026). The initial dataset contains information on a total of 4,462 candidates from 28 different political entities. For this study, the analysis focuses on 2,052 candidates. Those candidates come from the six parties or electoral coalitions that were successful in the election. Specifically, the dataset includes all candidates from political subjects that surpassed the 5% electoral threshold and secured seats in the Chamber of Deputies in 2025: ANO, STAN, Pirates, SPD, AUTO, and the SPOLU coalition.

It should be noted that SPOLU consists of a coalition of three parties: ODS, KDU-ČSL, and TOP 09. Although they campaigned together and currently operate as a single entity in the Chamber of Deputies, they remain historically distinct entities that are likely to act independently in the future. For this reason, they are treated separately in the analysis. Consequently, while most other parties have approximately 340 candidates in the tables, the number of candidates for the individual parties forming the SPOLU coalition is logically lower. Similarly, while SPD included candidates from other minor parties on its lists, their numbers were negligible, and they were not categorised separately. The same applies to the Pirates, who had Green Party candidates on their lists.

The key focus of this analysis is on candidates who listed ‘mayor of a municipality’¹³ as their occupation on the ballot. These are compared with other candidate groups whose professional characteristics, according to existing literature, suggest a higher-than-average potential for gaining preferential votes (Atkeson & Hamel, 2020; Crowder-Meyer et al., 2020; Däubler & Linek, 2024;

Jurajda & München, 2015). For comparative purposes, the following groups were selected: ‘Doctors of Law’ (holding the JUDr. degree), medical professionals (indicated by titles MUDr., MVDr., or MDDr.), incumbent MPs from the previous term, and teachers or principals of primary and secondary schools. Deputy mayors are also treated as a distinct professional category. We assume that deputy mayors may achieve better results than average candidates due to the friends and neighbours effect or their perceived association with the mayors themselves. Furthermore, we have found no existing research in the Czech context that specifically analyses deputy mayors, despite their high-ranking status within municipal management.

A minor limitation of this analysis is its reliance on self-reported data from the ballot papers. Theoretically, a situation could occur in which a candidate would withhold their profession, list a different one, or fail to include their academic title. It would be possible to compare the data with a database of Czech political candidates (Linek, Škvrňák, Šoltés, & Titl, 2025), although we assume that any incorrectly listed data would involve only a negligible number of cases, not statistically significant, given the total sample size of more than 2,000 analysed candidates.

Former mayors and deputy mayors are not included in these specific categories. If an MP also serves as a mayor, they are classified as an MP, based on the assumption that voters primarily associate the individual with their parliamentary role rather than their mayoral office¹⁴. Analogously, if a mayor or deputy mayor also holds a law or medical degree, or is a teacher, they are classified as a mayor or deputy mayor, respectively¹⁵.

We acknowledge that these classification decisions are not self-evident. To assess their potential impact on the results, we estimated an alternative model in which professional titles (MUDr., JUDr., teacher) were assigned priority over mayoral, deputy mayoral and MP status. The results of this robustness check are presented in Appendix B. The two classifications yield substantively similar results for most categories. The main exception is MUDr., where the alternative classification produces a notably larger estimated effect, driven by the reassignment of candidates who hold both a medical degree and an MP status. We therefore retain the original classification as the primary specification.

Table 1 below displays the absolute numbers (relative numbers can be seen in Appendix Table A1) of these selected professions across the Czech Republic's regions.

Table 1:
Absolute numbers of candidates' occupations in Czech regions¹⁶

Region	Mayor	Deputy mayor	JUDr.	MUDr.	MP	Teacher	Other	Total
Central Bohemian	12	11	4	8	19	9	141	204
Hradec Králové	7	10	1	4	7	3	88	120
Karlovy Vary	7	5	1	4	3	3	61	84
Liberec	10	9	0	1	6	2	74	102
Moravian-Silesian	17	18	3	2	11	7	158	216
Olomouc	13	3	3	2	8	3	103	135
Pardubice	12	8	1	2	9	7	75	114
Plzeň	15	5	3	4	3	9	81	120
Prague	3	9	8	12	12	3	169	216
South Bohemian	8	10	2	7	9	7	89	132
South Moravian	16	15	3	2	8	6	152	202
Ústí nad Labem	17	10	1	4	10	4	110	156
Vysočina	8	10	1	3	5	4	89	120
Zlín	17	12	0	3	8	2	89	131
Total	162	135	31	58	118	69	1479	2052

Source: Own processing based on the data from the Czech statistical office

In certain regions, the number of mayoral candidates on parliamentary parties' ballot papers was significantly higher than in others. This could be due to differences in the number of municipalities across regions, but upon examining the data, no clear causal relationship was observed. To assess whether mayors in certain regions run for office more frequently than those in others, a long-term comparative analysis across regions would be required.

The distribution of professions across political parties offers an interesting perspective. More than half of the mayors from the parties that entered Parliament in 2025 elections ran on the STAN candidate list. Every fourth candidate from this party was a serving mayor. This high concentration of mayors within STAN is unsurprising and aligns with previous research highlighting the strong position of municipal leaders within the party (Lysek & Macků, 2022; Maškarinec, 2020).

A significant number of mayors were also present on the candidate lists of the eventual election winner, the populist ANO movement, representing one-quarter of all mayoral candidates. Moreover, ANO fielded 50 deputy mayors in the elections, the highest number among all competing entities. In contrast, the SPOLU coalition fielded only 26 mayors in total, possibly due to a decline in municipal leadership roles in recent years. AUTO and SPD, parties that can be characterised as anti-system, clearly face challenges in recruiting mayors or their deputies. However, SPD boasts the highest number of medical doctors apart

from ANO. Finally, while the Pirates have few mayoral candidates, they feature a significant number of deputy mayors on their lists.

It is important to note that AUTO is a new party without a strong regional base, and the SPD has long struggled to win seats at the local level. As a result, they lack a pool of candidates from which to field their own mayors. The Pirates, on the other hand, have at least managed to form coalitions at the municipal level, holding deputy-mayor positions, which they can then field in parliamentary elections.

From a general perspective, it is noteworthy that each party has a different position and different opportunities when it comes to recruiting candidates, and these may change over time depending on many factors. Mayors and deputy mayors represent the largest groups among the selected categories. Relative numbers of candidates' occupations are shown in Appendix Table A2.

Table 2:
Absolute numbers of candidates' occupations by party affiliation

Political party ¹⁷	Mayor	Deputy mayor	JUDr.	MUDr.	MP	Teacher	Other	Total
ANO	43	49	8	11	40	12	179	342
AUTO	6	3	5	5	1	7	313	340
KDU-ČSL	9	10	0	2	8	4	52	85
ODS	10	17	2	9	21	8	107	174
Pirates	3	22	3	9	10	15	281	343
SPD	0	5	8	10	14	7	299	343
STAN	88	25	3	6	15	11	195	343
TOP 09	3	4	2	6	9	5	53	82
Total	162	135	31	58	118	69	1479	2052

Source: Own processing based on the data from the Czech statistical office.

4. Methods

R (R Core Team, 2024) statistical software was used for data processing, model construction, and visualisation of calculations. The calculations were performed using the quantreg (Koenker, 2024) and margin (Leeper, 2024) packages. The results were visualized using the ggplot2 package (Wickham, 2024).

In the first part of the analysis, we examine whether candidates with chosen profession had a higher probability of being elected to the Chamber of Deputies with control on the position on the candidate list. We employ a probit model (Anděl, 1993) in the following form:

$$P(M) = \phi(\beta_0 + \beta_l \log(\text{position on the candidate list}) + \sum_{k=1}^K \delta_k X_k)$$

Where:

- M – a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the candidate secured a mandate and 0 otherwise, $P(M)$ is the estimated probability of the candidate being elected.
- Φ – the distribution function of the standard normal distribution
- X_k – binary variables indicating the candidate's profession, specifically:
 - Mayor
 - Deputy mayor,
 - Doctor of law (JUDr.),
 - Medical doctor (MUDr., MVDr., MDDr.),
 - Member of Parliament (MP),
 - Teacher (or principal) of a primary or secondary school.
- *Position on the candidate list* – a control variable representing the candidate's initial position on the ballot. Excluding this control variable could bias the results (for example, if incumbent MPs tend to be placed higher on the lists, their higher probability of election would be partially due to their position rather than their profession alone).

The probit model serves here as a tool for controlling ballot position rather than as a test of a general hypothesis about voter preferences. Based on this probit model, we then calculate the average partial effects (Wooldridge, 2010) for the selected professions.

Since there are only 200 distributed seats in the Parliament, the available data for comparing the success of individual professions across all regions and parties is relatively limited. Therefore, in the second part of the analysis, we evaluate candidate success not only by the criterion of being elected but also by the number of preferential votes received. This approach allows us to assess the relative success across professions, even among non-elected candidates. A candidate may receive a high number of preferential votes but still fail to secure a mandate due to an unfavourable position on the ballot¹⁸.


In the second part of the analysis, we examine the number of preferential votes received by candidates in relation to their initial position on the ballot. We establish the expected number of preferential votes for each position and then analyse whether individual candidates received more or fewer votes than is typical for their respective position on the ballot.

As illustrated in Figure 1 below, there is a clear relationship between the number of preferential votes and the candidate's position on the ballot. It is evident that this relationship is non-linear - the difference in the average number of preferential votes between the first and second positions is relatively large, but these differences gradually diminish as one moves down the list.

From approximately the 12th position onward, the average number of preferential votes remains nearly constant. The figure also reveals several outliers in the

data, representing exceptionally successful candidates who secured significantly more preferential votes than others at the same ballot position.

Figure 1:
Distribution of the number of preferential votes received in relation to the candidate's position on the candidate list



Source: Own processing based on the data from the Czech statistical office.

Based on the above, we employ a quantile regression model (Koenker, 2005) with a logarithmic transformation to estimate the expected share of preferential votes as a function of the candidate's ballot position. The model is defined as:

$$Q_{0.5}(\log y) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \log x,$$

Where y represents the share of preferential votes received and x is the position on the candidate list. This model estimates the median share of preferential votes relative to the candidate's rank and is therefore more robust to outliers than, for example, a standard linear regression model.

The quantile regression model also allows us to estimate the 25th and 75th percentiles of preferential votes in relation to the candidate's ballot position. These models enable the identification of exceptionally weak and exceptionally strong candidates, specifically, those who received fewer preferential votes than the predicted value for the 25th percentile, or more than the predicted value for the 75th percentile, respectively.

5. Results

Table 3 presents the average partial effects from the probit model, indicating the percentage-point difference in the probability of being elected for each profession relative to the reference category (all other candidates), after controlling for ballot position. The full probit model output (and robustness check for the classification of professions) is reported in Appendix B.

Table 3:
Average partial effects of selected professions

Profession	Difference in probability of being elected (pp)
JUDr.	5pp
Deputy mayor	4pp
MUDr.	3pp
MP	15pp
Mayor	4pp
Teacher	-1pp

Source: Own processing based on the data from the Czech statistical office.

In the 2025 elections, the largest difference in the probability of being elected was associated with incumbent MP status (+15 pp). Mayors, deputy mayors and medical doctors showed more modest but positive differences (+4 pp, +4 pp and +3, respectively). For teachers, the estimated difference was small and negative (–1 pp), suggesting no meaningful electoral advantage associated with this profession in these elections. For Doctors of Law, the estimated difference (+5 pp) is comparable in magnitude to that of mayors, though it is estimated with considerably greater uncertainty due to the lower number of candidates in this category.


Figure 2 below presents the distribution of the share of preferential votes received in relation to the candidate's position on the candidate list, compared to the modelled expected share of preferential votes (solid line). The figure also includes the modelled predicted shares for the 25th and 75th percentiles (dashed lines). The solid line distinguishes between successful candidates (those above the line) and weak candidates (those below the line). The lower dashed line identifies exceptionally weak candidates, while the upper dashed line identifies exceptionally successful candidates.

As evident from Figure 2, the advantage of holding a higher ballot position remains valid for the selected professions, which is a phenomenon confirmed across various types of elections (see e.g. Koppell & Steen, 2004; Lutz, 2010; Spáč, 2016; Voda, 2014). This reflects the confluence of two effects: political parties tend to place their strongest candidates at the top of the list, while voters often

mechanically select from the top. Furthermore, the figure shows that mayors are typically positioned at the top of the candidate lists. The majority of them were placed within the first 20 positions.

Figure 2:

Comparison of the distribution of the share of preferential votes received in relation to the candidate's position on the candidate list with the estimated median (solid line), 25th percentile, and 75th percentile (dashed line) of preferential votes received in relation to the position on the candidate list



Source: Own processing based on the data from the Czech statistical office.

Given that mayoral candidates are not evenly distributed across the Czech Republic (see Appendix Table A1), it is appropriate to analyse their performance through a geographical lens. Table 4 displays the proportions of successful candidates within selected professional groups across the Czech regions, specifically those candidates who received a higher share of preferential votes than is typical for a candidate at a comparable position on the ballot.

It is evident that mayors performed best in the Karlovy Vary region, where all seven mayoral candidates outperformed the expected results for their respective ballot positions and in Vysočina region. Strong performance of mayors was also recorded in the Olomouc, Ústí nad Labem, and Pardubice regions, where more than two-thirds of mayors exceeded their expected results.

In contrast, mayors were least successful in Prague and the Central Bohemian region, where only one out of three candidates outperformed the median. However, only three mayors ran for office in Prague. This can be attributed to the fact that while regions have hundreds of municipalities from which to recruit mayors, Prague has only 57 city districts¹⁹.

As Pileček (2021) suggests, the mobilisation of the home electorate is often more visible in smaller and less populated municipalities. This invites a discussion

on whether the total number of municipalities in a region or their average size plays a significant role. However, a comparison between the two most successful regions, the Karlovy Vary and Vysočina regions, suggests that regional structure alone may not be the decisive factor²⁰. Alternatively, it would make sense to look at the size of the individual municipalities represented by the mayoral candidates.

The table further indicates that mayors' success in a given region does not automatically translate into similar success for deputy mayors. In several regions, the proportions diverge considerably. The most pronounced contrast is observed in the Liberec region, where 60% of mayors but nearly 90% of deputy mayors outperformed their expected ballot position. A similar pattern, though less extreme, appears in the Zlín and Pardubice regions. However, in 8 out of 14 regions, mayors have achieved better results.

Table 4:
Ratio of successful candidates²¹ in selected professions in the Czech regions

Region	Mayor	Deputy mayor	JUDr.	MUDr.	MP	Teacher	Other
Central Bohemian	4/12	6/11	2/4	3/8	10/19	4/12	38/141
Hradec Králové	5/7	9/10	0/1	4/4	3/7	2/3	43/88
Karlovy Vary	7/7	2/5	1/1	4/4	0/3	3/3	44/61
Liberec	6/10	8/9	0/0	1/1	2/6	2/2	49/74
Moravian-Silesian	7/17	6/18	2/3	1/2	2/11	4/7	64/158
Olomouc	9/13	2/3	2/3	2/2	5/8	3/3	56/103
Pardubice	8/12	4/8	1/1	2/2	3/9	5/7	38/75
Plzeň	9/15	4/5	2/3	4/4	2/3	5/9	41/81
Prague	1/3	4/9	6/8	9/12	10/12	1/3	65/169
South Bohemian	5/8	5/10	1/2	4/7	3/9	4/7	38/89
South Moravian	9/16	6/15	2/3	2/2	3/8	4/6	59/152
Ústí nad Labem	12/17	9/10	0/1	4/4	3/10	3/4	65/110
Vysočina	7/8	6/10	0/1	2/3	2/5	4/4	41/89
Zlín	10/17	6/12	0/0	2/3	6/8	2/2	43/89

Source: Own processing based on the data from the Czech statistical office.

We can further distinguish the proportions of exceptionally successful candidates, those who significantly outperform the expected share of votes relative to their ballot position. These data are captured in Table 5, which reveals a trend broadly similar to that observed in Table 4. In most regions, the proportion of exceptionally successful deputy mayors equals or exceeds that of exceptionally successful mayors. Notable exceptions include the Karlovy Vary and Olomouc regions, where mayors outperform deputy mayors among the exceptionally successful.

Table 5:
Ratio of exceptionally successful candidates²² in selected professions in Czech regions

Region	Mayor	Deputy mayor	JUDr.	MUDr.	MP	Teacher	Other
Central Bohemian	2/12	2/11	1/4	1/8	4/19	4/9	19/141
Hradec Králové	2/7	4/10	0/1	3/4	0/7	1/3	22/88
Karlovy Vary	4/7	2/5	0/1	3/4	0/3	1/3	27/61
Liberec	2/10	1/9	0/0	1/1	1/6	2/2	25/74
Moravian-Silesian	2/17	5/18	1/3	1/2	2/11	2/7	33/158
Olomouc	5/13	1/3	0/3	1/2	3/8	2/3	28/103
Pardubice	6/12	3/8	0/1	1/2	1/9	4/7	22/75
Plzeň	4/15	2/5	0/3	3/4	2/3	3/9	20/81
Prague	1/3	1/9	1/8	5/12	6/12	1/3	43/169
South Bohemian	2/8	2/10	0/2	1/7	3/9	1/7	19/89
South Moravian	1/16	2/15	1/3	1/2	2/8	0/6	31/152
Ústí nad Labem	6/17	3/10	0/1	3/4	2/10	0/4	23/110
Vysočina	2/8	2/10	0/1	1/3	0/5	2/4	20/89
Zlín	4/17	2/12	0/0	1/3	2/8	2/2	23/89

Source: Own processing based on the data from the Czech statistical office.

In the Karlovy Vary region, exceptionally successful mayors account for 57% of all mayoral candidates in that region - the highest share across all regions. By contrast, in Vysočina region, where the ratio of successful mayors was 87.5 %, only 2 of them can be counted as exceptionally successful. In the Moravian-Silesian region, by contrast, deputy mayors appear to be considerably stronger candidates than mayors, with 28% of deputy mayors qualifying as exceptionally successful compared to only 12% of mayors. This aligns with the fact that the ANO movement, which fielded the highest number of deputy mayors on its lists, performed very strongly in this particular region.

For further comparison, Appendix Table C1 displays the proportions of exceptionally weak candidates. The highest proportion of exceptionally weak mayors is found in the Central Bohemian region, where they account for 33% of all mayoral candidates in that region, followed by the Hradec Králové region at 29%. Otherwise, mayors are rarely among the weakest candidates: out of the 170 mayors who ran on the lists of parliamentary parties, only 19 (11%) fell below the 25th percentile of preferential votes relative to ballot position. This compares favourably with deputy mayors, of whom 16% qualified as exceptionally weak. Medical doctors again stand out positively, with only 3 out of 58 (5%) falling below the 25th percentile - the lowest share among all professional categories examined.

A look at the distribution of successful candidates, those who received a higher share of votes than others at the same ballot position, primarily reflects

the strong overall electoral performance of parties such as KDU-ČSL and TOP 09, where the majority of candidates across virtually all professional categories outperformed their expected ballot position. As mentioned above, while the chosen quantile regression method does not allow a direct comparison of the overall performance of individual parties, it does enable comparisons across selected professions within each party.

In this regard, the data point to a striking paradox within STAN. Although the party is literally named 'Mayors and Independents', its mayoral candidates are the least successful professional group within the party: only 60% of STAN mayors outperformed their expected ballot position, compared to 76% of deputy mayors, 67% of medical doctors, and 82% of teachers. Doctors of Law within STAN achieved a 100% success rate, albeit from a small base of three candidates.

A different pattern emerges within ANO, where mayors (53%) considerably outperformed deputy mayors (24%), despite the party fielding the largest number of deputy mayors of any party. This suggests that while ANO successfully recruited deputy mayors in large numbers, their individual electoral contribution was more limited than that of the party's mayoral candidates. Within ANO, mayors are among the most successful candidates, as otherwise only 27% of ANO candidates can be considered successful.

KDU-ČSL and TOP 09 stand out for the uniformly high success rates across all professional categories, which likely reflects the strong list-level performance of these parties rather than profession-specific advantages. Among anti-establishment parties, SPD fielded no mayoral candidates but showed relatively strong results among candidates with law degrees (75%) and medical doctors (60%)²³

Also noteworthy are the results for lawyers, who can be classified as exceptionally successful candidates in only 13% of cases. And especially the results of deputy mayors from the Pirates. Nearly 80% of their deputy mayors received more preferential votes than expected for their positions on the ballot. Pirates candidates were generally the most successful in this metric, with nearly 75% exceeding the expected number of votes. This points to the discipline of their supporters. On opposite side, are the populist parties.

Table 6:
Ratio of successful candidates in selected professions by party affiliation

Party	Mayor	Deputy mayor	JUDr.	MUDr.	MP	Teacher	Other
ANO	23/43	12/49	5/8	8/11	8/40	7/12	37/179
AUTO	2/6	1/3	0/5	3/5	1/1	5/7	59/313
KDU-ČSL	9/9	10/10	0/0	2/2	8/8	4/4	46/52
ODS	7/10	13/17	1/2	8/9	12/21	5/8	78/107
Pirates	2/3	17/22	2/3	9/9	9/10	13/15	214/281
SPD	0/0	2/5	6/8	6/10	5/14	1/7	77/299
STAN	53/88	19/25	3/3	4/6	4/15	9/11	130/195
TOP 09	3/3	3/4	2/2	4/6	7/9	5/5	43/53

Source: Own processing based on the data from the Czech statistical office.

6. Conclusions

The presented study examined mayors' electoral performance in the 2025 Czech parliamentary election, focusing on their ability to secure preferential votes and their overall performance. The findings provide clear answers to selected research questions and contribute to the broader understanding of personalised politics in the Czech Republic.

The analysis confirms that mayors remain a significant source of recruits for national politics. Among the selected professions expected to achieve better results than the average candidate, mayors are the most frequently fielded group. In the last elections to the Chamber of Deputies, they constituted more than 8% of candidates from parliamentary parties. If deputy mayors are included, leaders of Czech municipalities represented 15% of all candidates.

Regarding the first research question, we found that mayors hold a statistically significant electoral advantage, with a 4 pp higher probability of being elected than average candidates. However, their electoral power is not limitless, and mayors may not be as omnipotent as their voters or the political parties themselves often believe. In the 2025 elections, they did not significantly outperform other high-status professions such as doctors (+3 pp) and MPs (+15 pp). The quantile regression model also showed that while mayors consistently improve their ballot positions, they often hit a ceiling where their status cannot overcome the dominance of MPs, and leaders of the candidate lists.

Regarding the second research question, mayors' electoral performance varies significantly across parties and regions. For STAN, mayors and other local politicians represent an integral part of their identity. This is reflected in the fact that the majority of mayors who participated in elections to parliamentary parties are from STAN, and also in the fact that mayors account for 26% of their

candidates. The second party that capitalises on mayors is the ANO movement. However, compared to STAN, it fielded only half as many mayors. Nevertheless, the high number of deputy mayors running for ANO suggests that while the movement values their candidacy, it may face challenges in recruiting incumbent mayors to its ranks.

Other parties fielded far fewer mayors. The entire SPOLU coalition had only 26, and other parties combined had only 9. Especially for anti-establishment parties such as the SPD and AUTO, this highlights a problem that can be broken down into multiple parts. One problem is recruiting local elites. Another is that SPD has been struggling to become part of coalitions across the Czech political system. This also means they were unable to create their own mayors, as they were mostly in opposition at the municipal level. This may change now, when they are part of the government. It would make sense to form coalitions on a similar basis at the city level. In this case, though, it can be assumed that the mayoral post would almost always go to ANO regardless. AUTO is a newly established party and apart from the independent mayors they recruited and the political converts, they have not yet had a chance to establish their own mayors.

The Pirates, while having a small number of mayors, fielded a high number of deputy mayors. This fact relates to the Pirates' ongoing struggle to penetrate the local level (see e.g. Malý, 2024; Maškarinec & Naxera, 2022). On the other hand, it shows that Pirates are becoming more established at the local level, as 22 deputy mayors are comparable to STAN and SPOLU.

The findings further suggest that the electoral impact of mayors reaches a saturation point. In the case of the STAN movement, the high concentration of municipal leaders on the ballot appears to lead to internal cannibalisation of preferential votes. This indicates that while having a mayor on the list is an asset, fielding too many simultaneously may result in the fragmentation of local support. This corresponds with the findings of Dodeigne and Pilet (2021) who argues that intra-party competition in flexible list systems like the Czech one is characterised by concentration of votes on a group of prominent candidates. In the case of STAN, where mayors represent a significant portion of candidates, this may lead to dispersion of support among them.

These findings thus contribute to the debate on the personalisation of politics by suggesting that the 'mayoral bonus'²⁴ is less about the office itself and more about being part of a broader group of trusted professionals who can build connections at the local level. This supports the already established findings regarding the functionality of the friends and neighbours effect at the level of the Czech parliamentary elections (Pileček, 2021; Voda & Pink, 2009). Moreover, this trend, in which voters seek personal credibility regardless of the specific executive office held, persists despite the polarisation in Czech society.

The presented study naturally has its limitations. The most visible is its restriction to a single election term, which prevents tracking the long-term development of mayors' strength in parliamentary elections. It also relies on self-re-

ported occupations on ballot papers, which excludes former mayors whose local influence might still be significant.

Additionally, future research could monitor the length of mayoral mandates and their influence on election results. Which could be possible with the data from the database of Czech political candidates (Linek et al., 2025). Also, a spatial analysis of the size of the home municipality, which directly correlates with the magnitude of the preferential vote gain, could be beneficial.

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Appendix A

Appendix Table A1:
Relative numbers of candidates' occupations in Czech regions

Region	Mayor	Deputy mayor	JUDr.	MUDr.	MP	Teacher	Other
Central Bohemian	6%	5%	2%	4%	9%	4%	69%
Hradec Králové	6%	8%	1%	3%	6%	3%	73%
Karlovy Vary	8%	6%	1%	5%	4%	4%	73%
Liberec	10%	9%	0%	1%	6%	2%	73%
Moravian-Silesian	8%	8%	1%	1%	5%	3%	73%
Olomouc	10%	2%	2%	1%	6%	2%	76%
Pardubice	11%	7%	1%	2%	8%	6%	66%
Plzeň	13%	4%	3%	3%	3%	8%	68%
Prague	1%	4%	4%	6%	6%	1%	78%
South Bohemian	6%	8%	2%	5%	7%	5%	67%
South Moravian	8%	7%	1%	1%	4%	3%	75%
Ústí nad Labem	11%	6%	1%	3%	6%	3%	71%
Vysočina	7%	8%	1%	3%	4%	3%	74%
Zlín	13%	9%	0%	2%	6%	2%	68%
Total	8%	7%	2%	3%	6%	3%	72%

Appendix Table A2:
Relative numbers of candidates' occupations by party affiliation

Political party	Mayor	Deputy mayor	JUDr.	MUDr.	MP	Teacher	Other
ANO	13%	14%	2%	3%	12%	4%	52%
AUTO	2%	1%	1%	1%	0%	2%	92%
KDU-ČSL	11%	12%	0%	2%	9%	5%	61%
ODS	6%	10%	1%	5%	12%	5%	61%
Pirates	1%	6%	1%	3%	3%	4%	82%
SPD	0%	1%	2%	3%	4%	2%	87%
STAN	26%	7%	1%	2%	4%	3%	57%
TOP 09	4%	5%	2%	7%	11%	6%	65%
Total	8%	7%	2%	3%	6%	3%	72%

Appendix B

Table B1 presents the full output of the probit model underlying the average partial effects reported in Table 3 of the main text. Table B2 presents the results of a robustness check using an alternative classification in which professional titles (MUDr., JUDr., teacher) were assigned priority over mayoral status. As discussed in the Data section, the two classifications yield substantively similar results for most categories. The main difference concerns MUDr., where the alternative classification produces a larger estimated effect (+10 pp vs. +3 pp in the alternative), driven by candidates who hold both a medical degree and an MP status and are classified differently across the two specifications.

Appendix Table B1:
Probit model output

Variable	Coefficient	Standard error	p-value
Intercept	0.27	0.12	0.02
log(position on the candidate list)	−0.968	0.06	< 0.001
Mayor	0.36	0.16	0.02
Deputy mayor	0.38	0.18	0.04
JUDr.	0.32	0.31	0.3
MUDr.	0.76	0.21	< 0.001
MP	1.09	0.17	< 0.001
Teacher	−0.256	0.37	0.49

Source: Own processing based on the data from the Czech statistical office.

Appendix Table B2:
Average partial effects: alternative classification
(professional title > mayoral status > MP status)

Profession	Difference in probability of being elected (pp)
JUDr.	2pp
Deputy mayor	4pp
MUDr.	10pp
MP	16pp
Mayor	4pp
Teacher	0pp

Source: Own processing based on the data from the Czech statistical office.

Appendix C

Appendix Table C1:
Ratio of exceptionally weak candidates²⁵ in selected professions in Czech regions

Region	Mayor	Deputy mayor	JUDr.	MUDr.	MP	Teacher	Other
Central Bohemian	4/12	3/11	1/4	1/8	6/19	2/9	71/141
Hradec Králové	2/7	0/10	0/1	0/4	3/7	0/3	23/88
Karlovy Vary	0/7	1/5	0/1	0/4	0/3	0/3	4/61
Liberec	1/10	0/9	0/0	0/1	2/6	0/2	9/74
Moravian-Silesian	3/17	4/18	1/3	0/2	4/11	0/7	48/158
Olomouc	0/13	0/3	1/3	0/2	1/8	0/3	12/103
Pardubice	0/12	1/8	0/1	0/2	5/9	1/7	21/75
Plzeň	2/15	0/5	1/3	0/4	1/3	0/9	16/81
Prague	1/3	2/9	0/8	0/12	2/12	1/3	63/169
South Bohemian	1/8	3/10	1/2	0/7	5/9	0/7	28/89
South Moravian	1/16	5/15	1/3	0/2	3/8	1/6	62/152
Ústí nad Labem	1/17	0/10	1/1	0/4	4/10	0/4	18/110
Vysočina	0/8	1/10	1/1	1/3	3/5	0/4	24/89
Zlín	3/17	1/12	0/0	0/3	1/8	0/2	19/89

Source: Own processing based on the data from the Czech statistical office.

Appendix table C2:
Ratio of exceptionally successful candidates in selected professions
by party affiliation

Party	Mayor	Deputy mayor	JUDr.	MUDr.	MP	Teacher	Other
ANO	8/43	0/49	1/8	3/11	4/40	2/12	8/179
AUTO	0/6	0/3	0/5	2/5	1/1	1/7	11/313
KDU-ČSL	6/9	10/10	0/0	2/2	7/8	4/4	29/52
ODS	5/10	4/17	0/2	5/9	4/21	2/8	49/107
Piráti	1/3	7/22	0/3	8/9	7/10	8/15	137/281
SPD	0/0	1/5	2/8	0/10	3/14	0/7	13/299
STAN	21/88	7/25	0/3	3/6	0/15	5/11	84/195
TOP 09	2/3	¾	1/2	3/6	2/9	3/5	24/53

Source: Own processing based on the data from the Czech statistical office.

Appendix table B3:
Ratio of exceptionally weak candidates in selected professions by party affiliation

Party	Mayor	Deputy mayor	JUDr.	MUDr.	MP	Teacher	Other
ANO	9/43	14/49	3/8	1/11	26/40	2/12	84/179
AUTO	2/6	1/3	2/5	0/5	0/1	1/7	163/313
KDU-ČSL	0/9	0/10	0/0	0/2	0/8	0/4	0/52
ODS	0/10	0/17	0/2	0/9	3/21	0/8	11/107
Piráti	1/3	3/22	1/3	0/9	0/10	0/15	25/281
SPD	0/0	1/5	2/8	1/10	6/14	1/7	107/299
STAN	7/88	2/25	0/3	0/6	4/15	1/11	26/195
TOP 09	0/3	0/4	0/2	0/6	1/9	0/5	2/53

Source: Own processing based on the data from the Czech statistical office.

Endnotes:

- 1 The full name of the party ‘Starostové a nezávislí’ can be translated into English as ‘Mayors and Independents’. This party consists mostly of mayors of smaller towns and municipalities (Maškarinec, 2020, p. 27).
- 2 One-third of the 33 newly elected STAN MPs were serving mayors at the time. STAN also had a higher number of former mayors on its list of candidates who had already defended their seats in the Chamber of Deputies.
- 3 In the latest poll by the Public Opinion Research Center, 58% of the Czech population trusted them, and they shared the top spot in the trust rankings with the president (CVVM, 2026). Previously, though, they had been in first place on their own for a long time.
- 4 The only exceptions are the European Parliament elections, in which mayors made up only 2% of the candidates in the last elections, perhaps because it is practically impossible to combine the roles of mayor and Member of the European Parliament. The second exception is the local elections themselves, where the influence of political parties is low and has been declining over the long term, as shown, for example, by Kostelecký et al. (2024).
- 5 Their research does not directly address mayors. However, a mayor must always be a member of the municipal council, and many of them are also members of the regional assembly.
- 6 A total of 34 mayors were elected, excluding former mayors who listed different occupations on their ballot papers, most commonly, that of a Member of Parliament. Data is drawn from the candidate lists. If a candidate was a mayor but did not list this as their profession, they are not counted as a mayor.
- 7 English equivalents for the names of those parties are: ANO (Action of Dissatisfied Citizens), STAN (Mayors and Independents), Piráti (the Pirate Party), SPD (Freedom and Direct Democracy). AUTO is a shortened version of Motoristé sobě and can be transcribed as ‘Motorists for Themselves’. SPOLU is a coalition of ODS (Civic Democratic Party), TOP 09 (Tradition Responsibility Prosperity 09), KDU-ČSL (Christian and Democratic Union- Czechoslovak People’s Party).
- 8 In this context, it is important to note that in both cases the data came from POLLEADER network scholars. The data was collected only for municipalities with more than 10,000 inhabitants.
- 9 Specifically, 108 out of 200 MPs were re-elected.
- 10 The initiative still has a functioning web domain, zakrouzkujzenu.cz. This could be translated into English as ‘vote for a woman’.

- 11 From a European perspective, these are equivalent to NUTS 3.
- 12 SPOLU, as a three-party electoral coalition, had a higher electoral threshold. For a single party, the threshold is at least 5% of the votes. A two-party coalition requires 8%, and a three-party coalition requires 11%. Although the SPD and the Pirates had candidates from other political parties on their candidate lists, these were not coalitions. Therefore, the 5% threshold applied to them.
- 13 In Czech *starosta* or its female equivalent, *starostka*.
- 14 There were a total of 8 such cases of mayors who were MPs and 4 deputy mayors.
- 15 These included 3 mayors and 2 deputy mayors, who were lawyers. Also, 9 mayors and 9 deputy mayors were teachers. Paradoxically, there were no cases of mayors who were doctors in the dataset, but 3 deputy mayors.
- 16 The official English names of the regions (in Czech: *kraj*) have been used. JUDr. = Doctor of law; MUDr. = Medical doctor; MP = Member of Parliament.
- 17 The party names have been left in Czech short forms. The Pirate Party does not have a short form so the term Pirates is used instead.
- 18 This reflects the institutional requirement that a candidate must obtain at least 5% of the total votes cast for their party in a given region to move up the list.
- 19 That is half as many as Karlovy Vary Region and one-twelfth as many as the Central Bohemian Region.
- 20 While Karlovy Vary is a small region with a relatively low number of municipalities (averaging over 2,000 inhabitants), Vysočina has no more than twice as many inhabitants, but approximately five times as many municipalities.
- 21 Candidates who received a higher share of preferential votes than usual candidates in a similar position on the candidate list.
- 22 Candidates who received significantly more preferential votes than would be expected given their position on the candidate list.
- 23 These results are further illustrated in the appendix tables B2 and B3.
- 24 Based on the term used by Balík (2009, p. 214).
- 25 Candidates who received significantly fewer preferential votes than would be expected given their position on the candidate list.