Czech Journal of Political Science

Old Wine in New Bottles: Hard Euroscepticism in the 2024 European Parliament Elections

Vít Hloušek — 2025-07-01

The article addresses the conceptualisation of hard Euroscepticism, which must reflect current crises and challenges facing European integration, such as the war in Ukraine. The conceptualisation of party-based Euroscepticism remains problematic, particularly in delineating a clear boundary between hard and soft variants. Szczerbiak and Taggart’s dichotomous typology is regarded as highly useful, offering two fundamental ideal types. However, its practical application proves more complex. Since Brexit, explicit calls to leave the EU have declined, supplanted by reformist narratives that blur traditional categories. Nonetheless, many political parties maintain fundamental objections to European integration, often concealed by strategic ambiguity. This article argues for the continued – but recontextualised – use of the ideal type of hard Euroscepticism, accounting for contextual and strategic variation and focusing not on the ‘essence’ of each type, but on the trajectory individual parties take in relation to the EU. It offers a theoretical and empirical framework for analysing manifestations of hard Euroscepticism in the 2024 European Parliament elections, drawing on both case studies and broader regional trends.

Hard Euroscepticism in the Shadow of Fidesz: the Our Homeland Movement in Hungary

Attila Horváth — 2025-07-01

The article investigates manifestations of hard Euroscepticism in Hungary, with a particular focus on the Our Homeland Movement (Mi Hazánk Mozgalom), a radical right-wing populist party founded in 2018. While the party’s manifestos articulate a deeply critical position on the European Union and explicitly propose holding a Huxit referendum within approximately five years – justifying its classification as hard Eurosceptic – an analysis of its online communication and parliamentary activity reveals a notable absence of EU-related contestation. The study also considers the case of Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség), which has, since coming to power in 2010, exhibited traits that transcend the soft Eurosceptic category. The article contends that the conventional hard/soft Euroscepticism dichotomy is insufficient for capturing the complex and evolving nature of Hungary’s ruling party’s relationship with the European Union.

Voting for Hard Eurosceptic Parties in 2024 European Parliament Elections in the Czech Republic: The Role of Salience and Attitude toward Czexit

Ivan Petrúšek — 2025-07-01

In this article, we test the applicability of the EU issue voting model to the case of the 2024 Czech European Parliament elections. Given the increasing importance of the issue of leaving or remaining in the European Union, we examine whether voters’ attitudes towards this issue affect their electoral behaviour. Furthermore, research on individual-level salience’s effects on EU issue voting is limited. To address this gap, we leverage post-election survey data on the importance voters attribute to the issue of leaving the EU to assess whether salience influences turnout and moderates the effect of voter preferences on party choice. We show that voters who judge the issue of Czexit to be highly salient are less likely to abstain. Additionally, we find that in general, voters’ attitudes regarding Czexit exert only a weak effect on their decision to support parties that reflect their views on this issue. However, we find that this effect is moderated to a large degree by the salience that voters attribute to the issue, in that voters considering the question of Czexit to be highly salient are considerably more likely to support parties that match their preferences (i.e. Czexit supporters vote for hard Eurosceptic parties and remain supporters for non-hard Eurosceptic parties). Thus, the study concludes that voter behaviour largely follows an EU issue voting logic, highlighting the key role played by issue salience in this process.

Political Polarization as a Trigger of Hard Euroscepticism: The case of Bulgarian 2024 EP Elections

Milen Lyubenov — 2025-07-01

In Bulgaria, where most of the population supports the European membership of the country, the space for Eurosceptic parties (hard or soft) is not very large. At the same time, as the case of Bulgarian 2024 European Parliament elections demonstrate a variety of political parties resort more and more often to Euros- ceptic rhetoric.Our article focuses on the most vocal Eurosceptic party in the country the political party Vazrazhdane (Revival). Vazrazhdane is a populist radical right par- ty that can be classified as a hard Eurosceptic party. In our article we argue that the hard Euroscepticism of Vazrazhdane is a result not only from the party ideological positions but also of the party strategic considerations. Another important aspect of the observed hard Euroscepticism of the party is the fact that is nurtured by the long lasting political crisis in the country and the significant political polarisation observed in Bulgaria.The article explores the hard Eurosceptic discourse of Vazrazhdane during the 2024 European Parliament Elections that happened simultaneously with snap general elections in the country. Our analysis is based on party documents, party manifestos and leaders’ and other officials’ speeches and interviews in the course of both EP and general elections in 2024.

Features of Euroscepticism in the Euro-Optimistic Society: Mapping Lithuanian Party-Based Euroscepticism

Sima Rakutiene — 2025-07-01

This article examines the political manifestations of Eurosceptic Lithuanian political parties and their degree of Euroscepticism in the context of a rather euro-optimistic Lithuanian society. The Eurobarometer surveys (2024) indicate that more than 77% of Lithuanian citizens (higher than the EU average) consider the EU a very important institution. However, there has been an increased number of Eurosceptic party lists in the European Parliament elections in 2024 and increased number of elected representatives joined Eurosceptic political groups in the EP. The aim of this paper is to analyse the extent and characteristics of Euroscepticism among Lithuanian political parties. The research includes an analysis of the data on the 2024 EP elections results, as well as content analysis of the manifestos of Eurosceptic political parties. The study covers cultural, identity, economic, nationalist and pro-Russian aspects of the ideological orientations of political parties. It is argued that in Lithuania, party-based Euroscepticism are diffused and do not have a major influence on the national political agenda yet. Lithuanian Eurosceptic parties are characterized by a soft Euroscepticism and a similar ‘anti-genderist’, ‘pro-traditional family’ campaign.

Euroambivalent and Equivocal Euroscepticism: Two Shades of Strategic Ambiguity in the 2024 European Parliament Elections in Hungary

István Benedek — 2025-07-01

This study examines the dynamics of Euroscepticism in the context of Hungary’s 2024 European Parliament elections, focusing on the discourses of two outright Eurosceptic parties – the populist right-wing Fidesz and the far-right Our Homeland Movement – and the newly formed TISZA Party, which incorporates certain Eurosceptic elements. Employing a qualitative, single-country case study approach, our analysis draws on party leaders’ speeches, manifestos, campaign statements and other public communications spanning from February 2022 to December 2024. The findings reveal that despite a predominantly pro-European public, the three selected parties espoused moderated and ambiguous Euroscepticism, which proved electorally successful, securing 19 of Hungary’s 21 European Parliament seats and over 80% of the vote. Behind this paradox, our analysis distinguishes between two elite-level strategies: Equivocal Euroscepticism, which strategically oscillate between soft and hard Euroscepticism on the integration dimension without advocating full withdrawal, and Euroambivalent Eurosceptic approach, which navigate between soft Euroscepticism and pro-EU stances on institutional design or certain policies while clearly endorse EU membership. This conceptual innovation provides a novel conceptual framework with broader relevance for comparative analyses of Euroscepticism, offering deeper insights into how domestic political contexts shape distinct party positions on European integration.